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Abstract:  
This paper analyses exchange rate control measures adopted in Italy and Bulgaria 
during the interwar period. The first two sections provide a detailed account of the 
institutional and economic framework in which these measures were enforced and 
interpret them utilizing statistical data. In the third section it suggests a theoretical 
interpretation of exchange control and clearing agreements stressing that these 
policies were a serious interference in market mechanisms. A further point is that 
exchange control introduced and practiced in Italy and Bulgaria was an eloquent 
example of how serious the balance of payments constraint was at that time and 
how difficult it was to circumvent it. In the last section it derives some lessons for 
today’s Italian and Bulgarian economies.  
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  Il mio sentimento d’amicizia per la Bulgaria è costante, 
sincero, disinteressato. Questo sentimento è condiviso 
della totalità del popolo italiano. Credo fermamente 
nell’avvenire politico, economico e morale della 
Bulgaria. Essa ha il suo compito nei Balcani. 
   
  Mussolini, B. in Scipcovensky, M., (1927, p.1) 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
On the 6th September 1937, BNB governor Dobri Bozhilov sent confidential 
message N.166 to the Minister of Finance informing him that two Italians, 
Costantino and Camillo Vacaro, had violated the Foreign Exchange Act in 1933 
and had done so with the knowledge and assistance of the Italian ambassador in 
Sofia. Camillo Vacaro had brought certain amounts of money in Bulgarian 
currency to the Embassy, for which the Ambassador had given him cheques 
denominated in foreign currencies; those cheques had then been sent to Italy by the 
legation itself. The Governor asked the Minister of Finance to raise this delicate 
affair at the Council of Ministers before the BNB Governor brought a prosecution 
under the Foreign Exchange Act (BNB, 2004, No 297). The background of this 
historical detail connecting Italy and Bulgaria
1 was formed by a lengthy period of 
restrictions on trade and foreign currency exchange between the Wars, in which 
Bulgaria and Italy were active protagonists (the two countries were allies in the 
Second World War and economically belonged to the so-called Clearing Bloc).  
The history of interwar exchange controls in Europe provides us with 
interesting insights into the current development of the European Monetary Union 
and into the prospects for its enlargement, in which the exchange rate and monetary 
policy play central roles. As in the past, albeit in a different historical context and 
in different forms, Europe today could be divided into a centre, part-periphery and 
periphery: groups of countries at different stages of economic development. 
Therefore, we find it challenging to compare the evolution of exchange controls in 
two countries characterized by different economic conditions. Italy was 
representative of the semi-periphery and Bulgaria of the peripheral and then 
underdeveloped Balkans: both were external to the financial and industrial core of 
                                                 
1 In fact, the affair was rather a typical case of avoiding exchange restrictions. According to 
Charles Kindelberger the ways to circumvent exchange controls are to bribe a central bank 
employee, to export money with the help of diplomatic offices, or to smuggle 
(Kindleberger, 1990, [1984], p. 531).  
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Europe.  
The introduction of exchange controls typified the general collapse and 
fragmentation of the international monetary system, after the First World War put 
an end to almost 40 years of considerable economic and financial stability
2. The 
world economy suddenly split into blocs of countries with different economic and 
monetary behaviours. Two major attitudes towards economic policy confronted 
each other. The first was held by those who thought that a return to the old semi-
automatic regulatory mechanisms was possible and indeed necessary, and who 
viewed the gold standard as an integral part of these mechanisms. The second 
attitude was held by those who believed that a new era of economic relationships 
had come and hence new rules (active government interference) were required. 
This was a time when the world economy was going through an extremely unstable 
transition which ended with the Second World War. It led to the creation of the 
IMF and the World Bank as new supranational regulators of the world monetary 
system.  
As predicted by several economists at the time, exchange control turned out to 
be an extremely distorting and discriminating form of interference in monetary 
relations. According to Lionel Robbins, “Tariffs, exchange restrictions, quotas, 
import prohibitions, barter trade agreements, central trade-clearing arrangements – 
all the fusty relics of medieval trade regulation, discredited through five hundred 
years of theory and hard experience, were dragged out of the lumber-rooms and 
hailed as the products of the latest enlightenment” (Robbins, 1935, p. 114). From a 
global perspective, while the different blocs managed to preserve their relative 
shares of world export and the members of each bloc tried (and to some extent 
succeeded) to balance their foreign trade within the group, the emergence of 
isolated blocs resulted in a contraction in the amount of world trade.  
Table 1: Percentage share of certain groups of countries in gold value of 
world exports, excluding the United States  
1929 1931 1935 1937
European exchange control countries 23.48 27.19 21.68 22.53
Gold bloc 14.53 15.86 13.41 12.01
Other countries 61.99 56.95 64.91 65.39 
Source: League of Nations (1938). 
Michael Heilperin gives a working definition of exchange control: “Exchange 
control,” he writes, “consists in the centralization of all dealings in foreign 
exchange in the hands of a public authority (treasury, central bank, or an institution 
                                                 
2 See Fromkin (2004) for a general discussion on the outbreak of the First World War.  4   
created ad hoc)” (Heilperin, 1939, p. 238). Howard Ellis (1940, 1947) provides an 
extensive discussion of the instruments and forms of exchange control. He stresses 
the fact that exchange control “is not generally taken to include the following: 
tariffs, quotas, prohibitions and embargoes, subsidies, state trading and commercial 
agreements and treaties. It impinges upon these at points but does not include 
them” (Ellis, 1947, p. 877). According to Ellis, the main instruments of exchange 
control are: a government monopoly in foreign exchange dealings, government 
disposition over private holdings of foreign exchange and assets, enforcement of an 
overvalued or undervalued rate of exchange, multiple exchange rates, government 
licence to export and import, government disposition over the proceeds of exports, 
government allocation of exchange to imports, officially conducted  bilateral 
clearing and officially conducted barter (Ellis, 1947, p. 877). 
Various combinations of these instruments were used to achieve a mix of 
exchange controls either with regard to international economic matters 
(maintaining appreciated or depreciated exchange rates, attaining equilibrium in the 
balance of payments, allowing trade to go on without available foreign exchange, 
securing more favourable terms of trade, controlling or enforcing capital 
movements and economic welfare) or to domestic economic priorities (controlling 
inflation and deflation, increasing domestic employment, fostering industrialisation 
and other protectionist measures, preparing for war, providing revenue for the state, 
and discriminating for or against certain people or classes within the domestic 
economy). According to the Ellis classification, the most common and widely 
implemented exchange control instrument in Europe in the Thirties was the 
enforcement of overvalued rates of exchange as a device to avoid depreciation 
which would have ensued because of the withdrawal or flight of capital from 
debtor countries (Ellis, 1947, p. 878-879). Given the European experience of high 
inflation (hyperinflation in some countries) after the First World War, the original 
motive for exchange control was to defend a particular exchange rate as a counter 
inflationary measure. Since this exchange control instrument did not contribute to 
improving the balance of payments, other interference included active export 
encouragement and import restrictions.  
Given the complexity of this topic, we will start with a description, drawing up 
a parallel chronology of events in Italy and Bulgaria supported by facts. The 
purpose of this paper is to analyze the motives behind governments’ decisions to 
introduce a nd maintain exchange controls, the economic consequences of these 
decisions, the techniques adopted, and the order of events (Ellis, 1947). From a 
theoretical standpoint, we will study exchange control in the context of economic 
and monetary isolation (autarchy). To describe the motivation behind policy 
decisions, we are going to introduce appropriate elements of institutional and 
political economy. We will also take into account the macro influences of 
exchange controls on the real economy.   
In the first two sections of the paper we will describe the history of exchange  
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controls in Italy and Bulgaria in the interwar period, illustrating it with data. In the 
third section, we will suggest some theoretical reflections and interpretations of 
exchange control. In the conclusion, we will try to derive some lessons from the 
Thirties’ exchange control and draw parallels with today.  
 
2.  Italy: Stabilisation and Short-Lived Exchange Control 
Measures aimed at regulating exchange rates had been introduced in Italy in 1917, 
during World War I. After 1921, however, most of the restrictions were lifted and 
it was only in the years 1934-35 that systematic exchange rates control was 
enforced as a consequence of protracted balance of payments deficits, in a context 
characterized by the so-called “quota novanta”, the stabilization level chosen in 
December 1927 when the gold exchange standard was officially re-established and 
which the government had decided to defend at all costs. It soon became a means 
to promote reflationary m onetary policies and to divert scarce resources towards 
sectors which appeared to be strategic in view of the war. 
Let us briefly recapitulate the events
3. During the First World War Italy had to 
face large current account deficits (from 1915 to 1918 import nearly tripled whilst 
export stagnated) which stemmed from huge capital disruptions caused by the 
conflict. As a consequence, the nominal exchange rate of the lira rapidly 
depreciated and this tendency was reinforced by speculative attacks following a 
major defeat by the Italian army in Caporetto, in November 1917. In December the 
government reacted by creating a new authority, the “Istituto Nazionale per i 
Cambi con l’Estero” (INCE, National Institute for Foreign Exchange) and by 
empowering it to impose a temporary monopoly of the foreign exchange market. 
The INCE was meant to offset speculation and to ensure that foreign currencies 
were primarily used to import raw materials and equipment needed by the military 
sectors (Raitano, 1995, pp. 276-9).  
The postwar period in Italy was characterized by severe monetary and financial 
instability; the nominal exchange rate further depreciated between 1919 and 1921  
as a consequence of current account deficits and speculative capital movements
4. In 
                                                 
3 For a reconstruction of economic and institutional events in Italy during the interwar 
period cf. Toniolo, 1980; Zamagni, 1993. 
4 Between 1913 and 1921 the value of the lira in terms of the dollar decreased from 5.27 
(Lit/$) to 23.46; in terms of the pound from 25.71 to 90.17. For most of this period, 
however, the nominal depreciation of the lira was insufficient to offset the loss in 
competitiveness caused by the differentials in inflation between Italy and its trading 
partners (in particular, United States and Great Britain). As a consequence, between 1915 
and 1918  and between 1920 and 1922 the real effective exchange rate of the lira actually 
increased (from 101.2 to 130, base year 1900, and from 74 to 96.6, base year 1929, 
respectively; cf. Ciocca-Ulizzi, 1990). In 1919 and in the first half of 1920, on the contrary,  6   
June 1921, however, the government decided to lift all restrictions in the foreign 
exchange market. The INCE was kept in existence but its role was restricted to a 
limited set of operations. 
At the end of 1922, Mussolini was appointed prime minister in a situation 
characterized by political and social turmoil.  Before long the new government 
proceeded to restrict political freedom but adopted, at least initially, a laissez-faire 
approach in economy policy and adhered to financial orthodoxy. The Minister of 
Finance, Alberto De’ Stefani, severely cut public expenditure in order to reduce 
budget deficit. The monetary policy, however, was too accommodating and as a 
consequence inflation increased, reaching 15% in the third quarter of 1925 
(Fratianni-Spinelli, 1997, p. 136). The b alance of trade also worsened: nominal 
exchange rate in terms of dollars fell to 27.5. In February 1925, therefore, De’ 
Stefani had to reintroduce some limitations on transactions in the foreign exchange 
market and entrusted the INCE with the task of gathering information on the 
amount of foreign credits and debts held by financial institutions and professional 
brokers (Raitano, 1995, pp. 296-7). In the second half of 1925 further measures 
aimed at curbing speculative capital movements were introduced by the new 
Minister of Finance, Giuseppe Volpi, as a preliminary step for the stabilization of 
the lira (Guarneri, 1988, p. 210; De Cecco, 2003). In November Volpi was able to 
reach a settlement of the war debts with the United States and UK. This move, by 
removing legal obstacles to international loans, was followed by large inflows of 
foreign capital. 
In the short run, however, following the collapse of the French franc, the lira 
was targeted by speculative attacks: during 1926 the nominal exchange rate of the 
lira had fallen to 153 relative to the pound and to 31.5 relative to the dollar, raising 
widespread concern among small savers in Italy and financial circles abroad. In a 
highly publicized speech  delivered in Pesaro,  in August 1926, Mussolini 
committed his government to an outright “defense of the lira”. This statement was 
followed by a centralization of issuing (the Bank of Italy was to become officially 
the only bank of issue in the country) and by severe credit restrictions. Nominal 
wages and some retail prices were also cut by 20% by decree. This determined a 
change of expectations and, in the following months, the nominal exchange rate 
between the lira and the pound rapidly decreased to 88-90. On 21 December 1927 
the government officially pegged the lira to gold thereby adhering, similarly to 
most other European countries, to a gold exchange standard system
5. The “gold 
content” of the currency was put at 7 .918 grams per 100 lira; this implied a 
nominal exchange rate at 90 lire per pound and at 19 lire per dollar.  
                                                                                                                            
nominal depreciation was so fast that the real exchange rate decreased signaling an increase 
of the competitiveness of Italy (cf. Cotula-Spaventa, 2003, p. 216). 
5 R. Decreto Legge  21/12/1927  n. 2325 “Per la cessazione del corso forzoso e 
convertibilità in oro dei biglietti della Banca d’Italia”.  
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The reasons underlying Mussolini’s decision to proceed to a sharp revaluation 
of the lira and the consequence of this measure on the Italian economy  were 
debated by contemporary commentators and have also been explored at length by 
economic historians and historians of economic thought (cf. Barucci, 1981; Bini, 
1981; Cohen, 1972; Falco-Storaci, 1977; Marconi, 1982).  It would appear that 
political considerations were probably dominant. The middle class, which was the 
most important constituency of the regime, had been severely hit by postwar 
inflation and was strongly in favor of any measure aimed at increasing the internal 
as well as the external value of the currency. Sheer prestige also played an 
important role: the exchange rate adopted in 1927 was roughly the same as that 
which had  prevailed in 1922, when Mussolini had taken power, enabling him to 
declare that, contrary to previous governments, his regime had been successful in 
defending the currency. The industrialists, especially those operating in the export 
sectors, were of course against “quota 90”: indeed, they actively lobbied  to 
stabilize the currency at a higher nominal rate (120 lire per pound). They were 
however partially compensated by cuts in wages and taxes and by the introduction 
of import duties. 
As predictable, in spite of all the efforts made by the government to cut wages 
and prices,  the  Italian economy had to face a remarkable reduction of its 
competitiveness: between 1926 and 1927 the real effective exchange rate of the lira 
increased from 95.5 to 105.9 (Ciocca-Ulizzi, 1990, p. 367). As a consequence, 
export decreased from 18170 in 1925 to 15519 million lira in 1927; during the 
same year, however, import decreased even more (from 25879 to 20375 million) 
and the result was a short run reduction of the trade deficit (from 7335 to 4856 
million)
6. Therefore the situation did not appear to be particularly worrying, if we 
consider the fact that from the very beginning of the industrial take-off at the end 
of the nineteenth century, Italy had to face a structural imbalance of its net exports, 
which were compensated by other components of its current account, especially 
remittances from emigrants and tourism (Falco, 1995)
7. During the Twenties 
remittances from emigrants actually decreased, but were counterbalanced by 
capital inflows resulting from loans contracted in the US financial market by Italian 
firms and municipalities. This implied an increase in Italy’s foreign debt to a level 
which was considered excessive by the governor of the Bank of Italy, Bonaldo 
Stringher. Therefore, already in 1927 new measures were enacted which requested 
the government’s authorization as a precondition to take out new loans abroad 
                                                 
6 This situation proved to be only temporary; in 1928, following a bad wheat harvest, trade 
deficit increased to 7456 millions of lira. 
7 It is important to note that revaluation had serious consequences on the financial stability 
of firms: their debts increased in real terms and the value of their stocks decreased. As a 
result, their financial strength was compromised well before the onset of the Great 
Depression. 8   
(Storaci, 1989, pp. 298-9). 
Circumstances had  already changed by 1928-29: attracted by stock market 
speculation and by a remarkable increase in interest rates as a result of a restrictive 
policy inaugurated by the Federal Reserve, American investors were more and 
more reluctant to subscribe new loans abroad and indeed withdrew part of the 
funds previously invested in Europe. Some Italian investors, on the contrary, found 
it profitable to buy back the bonds in dollars issued by Italian authorities. 
Furthermore, one has to consider the flow of sums paid by the Italian government 
to US and UK Treasury as a consequence of the arrangements concerning the loans 
obtained during the war (cf. Hirschman, (1939), p. 166). Therefore, capital account 
turned negative, whilst at the same time trade deficit worsened, following a further 
reduction in export and a slight increase in import
8. As a result, between December 
1927 and December 1929 the reserves of the Bank of Italy decreased from 12105,9 
million lira (in gold and convertible currencies) to 10795,4. In spite of this, in 
March 1930 the Ministry of Finance was bold enough to officially abolish every 
form of control in the exchange rate market (Guarneri, 1988, pp. 262-3).  
The onset of the Great Depression, together with the protectionist measures 
adopted by several countries, brought the international trade to a collapse; besides 
that, Italian competitiveness was severely compromised by the devaluation of the 
pound in 1931 and by that of the dollar in 1933: the real effective exchange rate of 
the lira went up from 101.2 in 1930 to 112.4 in 1934 (figure 1). Not surprisingly, in 
1933 the nominal value of export was roughly one third of that in 1927. Import also 
shrank as a consequence of the recession and, as a matter of fact, the trade deficit 
was lower, in nominal terms, in 1931-33 than in the Twenties. Taking into account 
net transfers, current account was actually in surplus (Banca d’Italia, 1938, p. 114). 
However, the drain of the reserves of the Bank of Italy continued also in these 
years following adverse capital movements [cf. Table 2]. Once more, these were 
mainly due to purchases of Italian bonds issued abroad: the market price of these 
securities had decreased remarkably and it became even more profitable for Italian 
investors to buy securities characterized by a very low risk of default and which 





Figure 1: Effective exchange rates of the Italian lira (index 1929=100) 
                                                 
8 Net export deficit amounted to 7476 millions in 1928 and to 6536 in 1929.  
9 A positive side-effect of these adverse capital movements was that Italy’s external debt 
substantially decreased (see Banca d’Italia, 1938, p. 114).  
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Source: P. Ciocca-A. Ulizzi (1990) (the rise of the index means appreciation, the fall means 
depreciation). 
Even in this unfavourable situation the Italian government was resolute in 
defending the stabilization level decided in 1927. At the end of the London 
Conference in 1933, the Italian Minister of Finance Guido Jung adhered to the 
“gold bloc” by subscribing, together with the representatives of France, 
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland, a pledge to defend the gold 
standard at the existing parities. Italy, declared Guido Jung on that occasion, had 
“stabilized its currency to gold since December 1927 and [was] firm in defending 
the fixed exchange rate established at that time”
10. In order to improve 
competitiveness, the regime enforced two consecutive cuts in nominal wages in 
1930 and 1934. In September 1931, after the devaluation of the pound, it imposed a 
15% import duty. 
It soon became clear, however, that further deflation had excessive economic 
and political costs. The fall of prices during the early Thirties had severely hit the 
Italian economy: many firms were unable to reduce their production costs in the 
same proportion as their revenues and had to face serious losses, whilst the burden 
of their debt increased in real terms, threatening their stability. Already in 1933 the 
Bank of Italy had to increase circulation in order to bail out some leading banks 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Cotula-Spaventa, 2003, p. 300. “The Italian government”, added Jung in his 
speech, “maintains that wages and savings are sacred and that these are the only sound 
means to ensure economic growth”. 10   
(among them, Banca Commerciale and Credito Italiano) which in the previous 
decades had invested heavily in the industrial sector. The drop in prices had been 
particularly severe in agriculture, squeezing the incomes of the farmers. In 1934, 
furthermore, the balance of trade abruptly worsened as a consequence of an 
increase in imports and a further reduction of exports. The ensuing deficit (2.6 
billion lira) had to be cleared utilizing the already depleted reserves of the Central 
Bank [cfr. Table 2]. Since foreign exchange holdings had been exhausted, its 
governor, Vincenzo Azzolini, had to mobilize for the first time the stock of gold 
kept in the vaults of the bank (Hirschman, 1939, p. 167). This proved to be a 
turning point and the government quickly reacted by  imposing both systematic 
exchange rate control and quantitative import restrictions.  
Table 2: Reserves of the Bank of Italy and reserve ratios (millions of lira). 
1927 4547.1 7558.8 12105.9 55.5
1928 5051.9 6018.9 11070.8 55.8
1929 5190.1 5151.2 10341.3 55.1
1930 5296.8 4327.5 9624.3 53.2
1931 5626.3 2170.2 7796.5 47.6
1932 5839.5 1304.5 7144.0 46.7
1933 7091.7 305.0 7396.7 49.9
1934 5811.5 71.7 5883.2 41.2
1935 3027.2 367.4 3394.6 19.5
1936a 2338.5 37.1 2375.6










Note: 1936a: lira 1927; 1936b: lira 1936, after devaluation. 
Source: Banca d’Italia, Relazioni del Governatore, Tipografia della Banca d’Italia, Roma, 1927-
1937. 
On 26 May 1934, a decree  by the Ministry of Finance prohibited any 
transaction in foreign exchange except for the purpose of financing effective trade 
and industry requirements or for  traveling abroad. Any purchase by Italian 
investors of stocks and bonds issued abroad, as well as export of banknotes and 
cheques, were also prohibited. In December, a further decree prescribed that 
foreign exchange obtained in payment for goods and services previously exported 
had to be sold to the Istituto Nazionale Cambi con l’Estero. Besides that, banks and 
firms had to offer the INCE and, once requested, sell to it, all foreign credits and  
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assets in their possession. In the following months other measures were enacted, 
which enabled the government to take complete control of the exchange market. In 
particular, on 20 May 1935 a new department was created to coordinate and 
regulate, under the direct supervision of the Prime minister, the distribution of 
foreign exchange between firms (“Sovrintendenza allo scambio delle valute”). The 
new institution was directed by Felice Guarneri, former head of the economic 
research department of the Italian manufacturers association (cf. Banca d’Italia, 
1938; Assonime, 1940; Raitano, 1995). 
In the years 1935-36 these measures were confirmed and even reinforced in the 
face of an international policy decision which ultimately resulted in the disruption 
of the financial stability Italy had reached during the Twenties. In October 1935, 
after several months of preparation, Mussolini attacked Ethiopia. For the Italian 
economy this initially meant a substantial increase in public expenditure and in 
internal demand which led to a considerable reduction of unemployment, whilst the 
reserves of the Bank of Italy were subjected to a further drain. Shortly after the war 
began, Italy was declared an aggressor country by the League of Nations and was 
subjected to sanctions which restricted its ability to export and import goods. This 
implied a further tightening of exchange control. On 29 December 1935 the 
Department directed by Guarneri, now denominated “Sottosegretariato di Stato per 
gli Scambi e le Valute”, took control of the INCE and of the “Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista per il Commercio Estero” (an authority whose aim was to promote Italian 
export) becoming de facto the leading centre for economic policy decisions. In 
1937 it was transformed into a Ministry. Exchange rate control, writes Paolo Baffi, 
“became one of the main tools in the mobilization of resources to which the Italian 
economy was subjected for a whole decade (October 1935 to April 1945) by virtue 
of almost continuous involvement in military activities of greater or lesser 
importance” (Baffi, 1958, pp. 399-400). 
As mentioned, the government also  introduced severe limitations on import 
starting from 1934-35 (in the form of licenses, quotas etc.). Furthermore, similarly 
to other countries, it increasingly utilized bilateral clearing agreements as a device 
for circumventing the restrictive effects on international trade  of quotas and 
exchange rate controls. The technique was the following:  in each country, 
importers of goods made payments in local currency to an agency (in Italy the 
INCE). These sums were used to pay the exporters, again in local currency 
(Assonime, 1942; Renzi, 1943). A key aspect was the choice of the exchange rate 
to be used in computing the value of trade in each country. The first agreements 
were stipulated by the Italian authorities in 1932 and included countries which had 
imposed a strict exchange control: Austria, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Jugoslavia, Romania, Chile and Argentina (Guarneri, 1988, p. 355). At the 
beginning their aim was quite limited: to defreeze credits accumulated in previous 
years by Italian exporters. In the second half of the Thirties, however, when the 
external constraint became more binding, an increasing proportion of international 12   
trade started to be regulated by bilateral clearing: in 1939 over 50% of Italy’s 
import and export w as settled in this way (Tattara, 1991, p. 463). The most 
important agreement was the one with Germany.  At the end of the  nineteenth 
century this country was already a key trading partner for Italy, providing 12.2% of 
the latter’s total import and absorbing 16% of its total export; Italy, on the contrary, 
played only a secondary role for Germany (the data are in this case 3 .2 and 2 .5 
respectively; cf. Tattara, 1991, p. 461). Furthermore, the trade balance was mainly 
against Italy
11. In October 1934, two years after the initial agreement mentioned 
earlier, a new a nd more comprehensive agreement was signed by the 
representatives of the two countries. It presented two innovative points: i) invisible 
items, particularly tourism and workers’ remittances, were included in the clearing 
as a measure to balance the structural deficit of Italy’s net export of goods; ii) 10% 
of the total value of German export to Italy had to be settled in hard currency paid 
to the Reichsbank. Similarly to other deals concluded by Italy in this period, the 
1934 agreement was based on the principle of “delayed payment (waiting 
principle)
12”: Italian exporters obtained the payment of goods sold to Germany 
“within the availability of the remittances [...] arriving from the sale of German 
goods in Italy” (Tattara, 1991, p. 474). 
After the 1934 agreement, Germany quickly became by far the most important 
export and import market for Italy. In the years 1935-39 it supplied nearly a quarter 
of the goods imported by Italy and bought 17.7% of the latter’s export. During and 
after the Ethiopian war Germany became a key source of coal (30% of total import) 
and other raw materials
13. In the same years, Italy conversely continued to play a 
secondary role for Germany, providing only 2.5% of its imports and acquiring only 
4.9% of its exports.  This disparity had serious consequences: a s observed by 
several economists, when the trading partners in a clearing agreement are 
characterized by different economic strength and bargaining power, economic 
dependence and exploitation can ensue (Demaria, 1939; Assonime, 1942; Tattara, 
1991). Indeed, after 1936-37, Germany,  which had the strongest economy in 
continental Europe, successfully managed to buy from Italy more than it exported 
to it. In this way German authorities were able to obtain two results: i) they 
borrowed precious resources which  they needed for the war: “clearing balance 
claims”, observes Yeager, “as long as they went unspent, represented forced loans 
to Germany from countries poorer than itself” (Yeager,  1966,  p. 325); ii) by 
diverting Italy’s purchases towards Germany’s products,  they  increased the 
                                                 
11 “From the beginning of the century to 1930, the ratio of German imports to German 
exports had varied from 0.65 to 0.80” (Tattara, 1991, p. 475). 
12 See part III. 
13  The import of manufactured goods from Germany, on the contrary, declined partly as a 
consequence of the “autarky”, the program of national self-sufficiency promoted by 
Mussolini.  
  13 
economic and political dependence of the former country. In order to help the 
Italian exporters who otherwise had to wait several months before getting their 
payments, the INCE was authorized to emit warrants for the amounts due which 
could  circulate as credit instruments. Therefore the principle of “immediate 
payment” (financing principle) was introduced, which had positive effects on 
internal economic conditions. 
On 5 October 1936, following the collapse of the “gold bloc”, the government 
devalued the lira by 40.93%, the same percentage adopted in 1933 by the US 
authorities. As a result export increased, substantially relaxing Italy’s external 
constraint, albeit only in the short run (Pavanelli, 1990).  Some measures were 
adopted to check inflation, putting under control prices and rents and abolishing a 
15% duty on import, introduced in 1931.  
Any hope of restoring external and internal stability was however compromised 
by the increasingly aggressive international stance adopted by the regime between 
1937 and 1939: this included participation in the Spanish Civil War, the annexation 
of Albania, heavy rearmament. Predictably, this resulted in huge budget deficits, 
which were financed partly by issuing Treasury bonds and partly by an increase in 
monetary base. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the logical consequence of the increase 
in public expenditure and in private investments in the military sectors was a 
substantial worsening of the deficit in net exports. Given the political and military 
situation, however, no foreign country or international institution was ready to lend 
the resources  Italy needed. Italy, furthermore, lacked the bargaining power 
necessary to exploit clearing agreements in its own interest. At the same time the 
reserves of the  Central B ank had already  been depleted in the first part of the 
Thirties and during the Ethiopian war. Even if all available foreign currency was 
diverted, through exchange rate control, to buy the raw materials and goods needed 
to fight the war, external constraint posed an ultimate check  on the military and 
political ambitions of the fascist regime and paved the way for its defeat. 
 
3.  Bulgaria: Stabilization and Long-Lasting Exchange Control 
The Balkan Wars and the First World War put a severe strain on Bulgarian 
economy and finance. Under the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria had to pay a huge 
foreign debt and above all reparations equivalent to a quarter of the national 
income
14.  
Inflation (“expensiveness”  - the term used at the time by Bulgarian 
economists  to describe price increases) was very high and also devalued the 
                                                 
14 For an extensive discussion on Bulgarian economic development in the 20
th Century, see 
Avramov, 2001.  14   
national currency. The trade balance between 1919 and 1929 was at a deficit except 
for three years, with the surpluses far too small to make up for the negative balance 
in the rest of the period (Svrakoff, 1941, [1936], p. 300). The stages of Bulgarian 
stabilisation logically and chronologically followed the stabilisation processes in 
other countries, presenting the peculiarities of the periphery and of developing 
countries in general (for details, see Koszul, 1932 and Ivanov, 2001). As in other 
European countries, financial stabilisation was conducted in the context of 
orthodox monetary ideology which saw a  stable currency and balanced public 
finances as the bases of economic development. 
From its very beginning Bulgarian stabilisation was accompanied by a 
number of exchange controls and restrictions
15. The Foreign Currency and Foreign 
Currency Receivables and Credit Trading Act was enacted on 12 December 1918. 
A week later, on 19 December, the Foreign Exchange Institute (Kambialen Institut) 
was established with the main purpose of concentrating foreign currency inflows 
into the country and smoothing the highly volatile exchange rate. The Kambialen 
Institut having failed to improve the foreign exchange market (the exchange rate 
was subject to speculation and induced overall economic uncertainty), new 
exchange controls were put into practice. On 12 December 1923, the Foreign 
Exchange Act gave the BNB a foreign exchange monopoly. The foreign exchange 
market in Sofia closed and all bids and offers were directed to the BNB. The direct 
reason for this early form of exchange control was the depletion of foreign 
reserves, mostly denominated in Reichsmarks, due to German hyperinflation in 
1923. 
Despite signing new trade agreements in August 1925 and introducing 
more protectionist tariffs in 1926, Bulgaria’s balance of payments and foreign 
currency balances did not improve. The conventional methods of restricting 
imports and promoting exports were no longer efficient.  
New measures enforcing the exchange control
16 were introduced in May 
1924, logically related with the de facto stabilisation of the Bulgarian lev. A 1926 
law fixed the exchange rate at 139 leva to the dollar (the BNB bought a dollar for 
137.20 leva
17) and banknote cover was set at a third. In this case, exchange control 
genuinely fostered stabilisation which demanded foreign reserves (obtained in the 
                                                 
15 A detailed overview of the various foreign trade restrictions and exchange controls in 
Bulgaria is provided by Ivanov, 2001, Chapter 2.  
16 A sharp speculative doubling of the lev which hit Bulgarian tobacco sales abroad was 
recorded in June (Nenovsky, 2006). Two types of lev were introduced – home and foreign 
– with the home lev becoming foreign (and usable to pay for imports) only with the BNB’s 
leave. This dual national currency was not a Bulgarian invention as can be seen from the 
example of Romania (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1933, p.115).  
17 On 24 March 1926 the bid rate became 138.80, falling to 138.50 on 24 September 1926 
as the BNB tried to attract foreign capital by cutting margins.  
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form of a League of Nations’ Stabilisation Loan) and balanced public finances with 
customs revenue being a major item. A law of 22 November 1928 designated the 
BNB as an independent monetary institution in the spirit of the international 
agreements.  
Direct exchange market control invariably accompanied manipulation of 
the other two basic macro markets: imports and exports. Thus followed the 1928 
Wine Export Promotion Act, the 1932 Grape Export Promotion Act and the 1935 
Meat Export Promotion Act. In 1931 an Export Institute was set up, transformed  
into the Foreign Trade Institute (Institut za vunshna turgovia)
18 in 1940. Alongside 
export encouragement, import restrictions were more often and more effectively 
used. It is interesting to point out that customs tariffs between 1918 and 1930 
always involved administrative exchange rate manipulations. The customs 
exchange coefficient (the rate at which paper leva were converted into gold leva for 
the purposes of customs duties) was significantly different from the market rate. 
According to Toshev, thanks to this manipulation the government managed to 
increase tariffs by 80 per cent over just two years (1926 and 1927). 
Table 3: Bulgaria: customs (import) coefficients and official exchange rate 
of the paper lev (1918-1930) 
1918 1928 1930
15 XI 1 VII 15 VIII 1 XI 1 I 1 VII 1 I 12 X 1 VII 30 X 26 VII 3 VI
2 2.5 3 5 6 7 9 12 14 15 20 27
1.66 4.22 4.22 6.05 8.2 8.96 13.5 28.2 29.94 32.3 27 27
1.2 0.59 0.71 0.83 0.7 0.78 0.67 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.74 1
1922
Customs coefficient 
Exchange rate of the paper lev
Exchange rate of the paper lev/ customs coefficient 
1919 1920 1921
 
Source: Toshev (1943, p. 67). 
Exchange premia, introduced for a limited number of private deals in 1933 and 
considerably spread by 1935, acted in the same direction of depreciating the lev, 
‘circumventing the fixed exchange rate’, loosening deflation, and enhancing the 
inflow of convertible gold exchange. By performing a ‘market-determined’ 
depreciation of the official BNB rate, exchange premia gave exporters the stimulus 
to export more at lower prices
19 (see box 1). 
                                                 
18 In 1930 the Hranoiznos (Food export agency) was established and invested with 
monopoly powers to buy and trade cereals as a specific tool against deflation. Because of 
the negative price scissors between buying and selling prices, losses were accumulated and 
transferred to the budget. Initially half and then a quarter of the payments to farmers were 
in treasury bonds representing domestic government debt, which amounted to around 400 
million gold leva (Berov, 1989, p. 465). 
19 Christophoroff (1939, 1947) provides a thorough description of the mechanism and role 16   
 
Box 1 Import tariffs, exchange rate premia and the real exchange rate 
 
Let us consider trade and exchange controls together, taking into account import 
tariffs and currency premia. If t is the tariff and f  is the currency premium (usually 
f=0, but it could be f  <0, in the case of the sperrmark in the Bulgarian private 
compensation market after 1935, for example), and considering the tariff as an 
addition to the foreign price level P* (P is domestic price level), and the currency 
premium as an addition to the nominal exchange rate level  e, the well-known 







) 1 )( 1 ( *
) 1 ( * / 1








The condition for real depreciation of the national currency (competitiveness 
gain) is:  
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Returning to the international scene, efforts at monetary and financial 
stabilisation rapidly yielded to the Great Depression which started in the USA and 
quickly reached Europe (first Austria, then Hungary, Germany and other 
countries). At the time countries used independent strategies to face the crisis 
(Eichengreen, 1997, [1996]; Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985)
20. Three blocks were 
formed: i. countries devaluating their currencies (United Kingdom (1931), the USA 
(1933), and Greece (1932)
21; ii. countries maintaining the gold standard, with 
France in the lead, and conducting a strict deflationary policy to limit wage and 
price growth; and iii. countries preserving parity and exercising exchange control 
(Germany, Italy, Hungary, Austria).  
Bulgaria joined the third group, being sceptical of  the foreign trade 
                                                                                                                            
of the exchange premia. At the beginning they differed across currencies which put them 
closer to Ellis’ definition of multiple exchange rates as an exchange control instrument.  
20  Many Bulgarian authors speak of a collapse of the world economy (Svrakoff, 1941, 
[1936], p. 310). A similar overview of the mechanisms of adaptation is given by Einzig 
(1934), p. 9. In Mises’s opinion (1932): “Countries which do not resort to inflation …do 
not put themselves in a position where it might appear advisable to have recourse to those 
measures comprised under the term Foreign Exchange Control” (Einzig, 1934, p. 9).  
21 In late 1931 16 countries preserved the gold standard, 12 had currency parity, and another 
11 kept gold parity by restrictions on trading foreign exchange (Svrakoff, 1941, [1936], p. 
312).  
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liberalisation measures recommended by the 1927 Geneva Conference
22. It is our 
general assumption that the reasons for Bulgaria introducing exchange control and 
opposing devaluation and deflation
23 were as set out below: 
First, Bulgaria was a debtor country which considered debt service a key 
priority (Leonidoff, 1966, 1969). In fact Bulgaria was an extremely diligent payer 
who pursued to preserve its reputation through debt service (Ivanov, 2004). Due to 
its political isolation after WWI, however, its endeavours as a good payer were not 
recognised and it had to shoulder its liabilities with almost no relief (Ivanov, 2001, 
2004)
  24. In his speech marking the BNB’s 50th anniversary, then-prime minister 
Andrey Lyapchev said, “one would be hard put to find quite such a young nation in  
such exacerbated circumstances as ours these past fifty years, yet which can boast 
that it has always occupied the position of an exemplary payer to its foreign 
creditors” (BNB, 2001, p. 135). 
With respect to structure, Bulgaria’s debt was denominated in gold backed leva 
and was mostly owed to non-devaluing countries
25. According to the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, “in Bulgaria it is almost certain that the transfer 
question has predominated” (1936, p.98) and the purpose of maintaining the 
currency on a gold basis “has presumably been to avoid an increase in the costs of 
the foreign debt service” (1936, p.129). Even before reparation payments began in 
October 1923, the foreign debt service had reached the amount of 112 million gold 
francs between 1918 and 1922: 16.3 per cent of the budget expenditure. 
Reparations under the 27 November 1919 Treaty of Neuilly were added to this, 
reaching 2250 million gold francs at a 5 per cent annual interest over 37 years, plus 
occupation expenses. This represented a quarter of the national wealth. The sterling 
devaluation offered some relief to Bulgaria since its debt was predominantly in 
pounds. Debt service now accounted for 11 per cent of the budget expenditure; 
there was no great BNB asset loss since a comparably small amount of assets was 
denominated in Sterling (the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936). 
Summarising the opinions of many economists at the time, a hypothetical 
devaluation would have certainly i ncreased the national debt burden, while any 
possible advantages would have been marginal (Sarailiev, 1937, p. 27). 
Second, the balance of payments constraints were particularly tight, and not 
                                                 
22 In 1926, however, there was a partial reduction of restrictions. In spite of much comment 
on the decrease of trade and exchange restrictions, the Andrey Lyapchev government did 
not have the political will to act.  
23 Christophoroff also points out that exchange control is a way of “fighting deflation” 
(Christophoroff, 1939, p.12) 
24 Bulgaria continued to pay reparations in 1933.  
25 French claims on Bulgaria were about 26 per cent of the overall Bulgarian debt. Next in 
the creditors’ list were Italy at 25 per cent, Greece at 12.7 per cent, and Romania at 10.55 
per cent.  18   
only as regards foreign debt service. The prices of agricultural products, which 
accounted for most of the Bulgarian exports
26, fell sharply on international markets 
and aggravated trade terms. The September 1932 Stresa Conference which focused 
on possible assistance to Southern European countries (a major part of the so-called 
‘agrarian bloc’) noted that the price drop reached 70 per cent (Bonnet, 1933, p.21). 
A fund concentrating revenue from the sale of agricultural products to developed 
countries was suggested in order to be used as partial debt service (the United 
Kingdom vetoed it). 
Third, systematic exchange control could be interpreted as a defence against 
restrictions introduced by Bulgaria’s trading partners. The farming price drop was 
combined with a number of restrictions on the import of agrarian products to 
Germany and France to protect indigenous farmers by economic and political 
means (Raupach, 1969). Turkey, an important Bulgarian trading neighbour, also 
introduced some limitations on Bulgarian imports. In April 1932 the drachma 
joined the devaluers’ club (Lazaretou, 2005) and Bulgaria lost its competitive and 
long-standing positions on the Greek market.  
The fourth and direct cause of exchange control was the intensification of 
capital outflow from Bulgaria at the end of 1931. This followed the collapse of the 
fragile monetary and financial stabilisation of the late Twenties and the Sterling 
devaluation. In addition to this global imbalance, Boshulkov (1927) provides a list 
of long-term domestic factors such as the purge and confiscation of capital claimed 
to be illegally accumulated during the Wars, and political instability, which 
certainly contributed to decrease Bulgarian capital accumulation and foreign 
reserves. 
Systematic exchange control came into force in Bulgaria
27 with the 15 October 
1931 Foreign  Exchange Trading Act and the BNB Ordinance  No.  1 of 20 
October
28. These instruments gave the BNB a strict foreign exchange monopoly, 
defining in great detail how foreign exchange was to be submitted to the BNB and 
how it could be dispensed for imports. Lists of luxuries the import of which was 
limited began to be compiled and amended. To keep foreign capital in Bulgaria and 
halt depletion of foreign reserves, the BNB raised interest rates, imposing further 
import restrictions in 1933. As other countries (including major trade partners 
Greece and Turkey) imposed exchange and trade constraints, the only reasonable 
way of letting foreign trade ‘go on’ was through bilateral clearing and even 
officially conducted barter (Ellis, 1947)
29. In a sense, exchange control was 
unilateral, while clearing  – an instrument to overcome the disadvantages of 
                                                 
26 Romania faced similar problems: Madgearu, V. (1939). For an overview of the Balkans 
economic situation in the Thirties, see Royal Institute of International Affairs (1936). 
27 In June 1931 the Naroden Blok government took office after the Demokratichen Sgovor. 
28 Also followed by Ordinance 4.  
29 A similar ‘going on’ argument is stressed by Jacque Rueff (1966, p. 79).  
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exchange control – was bilateral with some prospects of becoming  multilateral
30. 
Thus clearing followed exchange control as the latter inevitably hampered 
international finance and trade.  
 
Table 4: Selected Bulgarian macroeconomic indicators, 1927-1939 
1927 13078 28.3 489
1928 12897 31.2 -810 347 1928/9
1929 8984 42.2 -1928 185 1929/30
1930 9249 37 1601 1143 1930/1
1931 8620 36.6 1274 -891 1931/2
1932 7519 35.8 -88 -746 1932/3
1933 7442 36 644 -233 1933/4
1934 7278 35.3 287 -246 1934 (9 months)
1935 6549 34.4 244 -278 1935
1936 7158 33.8 729 283 1936
1937 8196 31.9 34 642 1937
1938 8250 31.8 644 510 1938















Note: 1) Christophoroff, A. (1939), p. 139. 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, (1934, 1937, 1941). 
Bulgaria signed clearing agreements with Austria (October 1931), Switzerland 
(April 1932), Germany (June 1932), and Italy (1933). At first clearing covered a 
small share of foreign trade but it soon became widespread and according to 
Michaely (1962) and Friedman (1976) occupied two thirds of trade turnover in the 
Thirties. Benham (1939) and Neal (1979) argue that Bulgaria, together with 
Hungary, was the country which used bilateral forms of international trade to their 
utmost, while being the sole country managing a fixed clearing exchange rate for 
the entire period of restrictions. In Michaely’s calculations (Michaely, 1962, ?. 
691) Bulgaria ranked last in a sample of 60 countries, with bilateralism 
                                                 
30 This Nazi wartime project (1940-‘42) was never systematically put into practice. In the 
case of Bulgaria trilateral agreements were used more after 1935 (see Christophoroff, 1939, 
p. 36). 20   
representing some 87 % of its foreign trade in 1938 compared with an average of 
70 %. It is interesting to note that in successive rankings for 1948, 1954, and 1958, 
Bulgaria kept the last position, this time in the context of the Eastern bloc
31. 
Many authors like Friedman (1976, ?. 117) shared the opinion that Germany 
was the logical clearing and bilateral partner for Central and Southern European 
countries (table 4) as a natural reaction against British and French tariff and non-
tariff restrictions under which trade with Bulgaria was bound to foreign debt 
service
32. Moreover, Britain and France did not extend credit lines as Germany did 
and they did not have similar markets and domestic demand. It was natural to 
partially compensate for the contraction of trade with France and Britain by 
expanding trade with Germany and Austria.  
Under clearing importers pay in their  national currencies, depositing money 
with their central banks, while exporters get paid in their national currencies by 
their central banks. Settlement is at an exchange rate agreed in advance. At first 
glance, the country with a stronger or appreciating  currency loses out by 
accumulating positive clearing balances which cannot be settled (for details see 
Neal, 1979) and thus attempts to increase trade outside clearing agreements. 
The difficulties of clearing and the need for greater flexibility prompted the 
appearance of a new institutional form of international trade: bilateral private 
trading with exchange rate premia; in 1933 compensation offices were established 
at chambers of trade. Bilateral private compensations were paid directly to 
importers in their national currencies. 
Table 5: Bulgarian Clearing and Non-Clearing trade. 
                                                 
31 Christophoroff (1939) provides his own calculations of this indicator.  
32 See for example the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1936, p.131).  Heinrich 
Hunke, chairman of the Council for German Economic Encouragement, underlined the 
differences between French/British and German Southern European policy in a 1942 Sofia 
speech which stated that trading with Germany had saved Southern Europe and the Balkans 
(Hunke, 1942, ?. 16-17).   



























1934 78.97 48.05 60.84 21.03 78.3 48.87 62.43 21.7
1935 77.25 49.48 68.09 22.75 80.19 59.82 75.11 19.81
1936 69.44 50.53 72.78 30.56 81.7 66.67 81.58 18.3
1937 65.52 47.11 71.91 34.48 79.9 58.22 72.82 20.1
1938 77.24 58.86 76.21 22.76 74.02 51.43 70.22 25.98
1938
a) 71.68 51.49 71.78 21.4 74.74 54.1 72.38 25.32
1939
a) 72.81 59.43 81.63 27.19 80.89 61.04 75.46 19.05
Years Export (shares, %) Import (shares, %)
 
Note: 
a) – export/import data refer to the first four/five months of the year. 
Source: Christophoroff, A. (1939) “The Course of the Trade Cycle in Bulgaria, 1934-1939”, p. 46, 
p.48. 
Studying the clearing mechanism in greater detail, however, reveals two forms 
of payment. The first implies that the foreign bank (the BNB in this case, providing 
there was a clearing surplus for Bulgaria) had Reichsmarks (sperrmarks) at its 
disposal  and paid to the importer in leva ( i. e., it bought Reichsmarks, called 
‘blocked marks’), thus increasing Bulgarian money supply and income and hence 
driving up import demand. In this case the BNB supported the Reichsmark by not 
allowing it to depreciate. The clearing foreign exchange obtained from clearing 
here was on the asset side of the BNB books. This was ‘the principle of immediate 
payment.’  
The second form, described as ‘the principle of delayed payment’, implied that 
Bulgarian exporters waited for t he sale of German goods and then bought 
Reichsmarks with their blocked leva
33. In this case the BNB refused to buy blocked 
marks until they had been requested by importers of German goods. Until such a 
request was made the Reichsmark would depreciate on the Bulgarian market. In 
this case the holding of blocked Reichsmarks did not create money, being on the 
off-balance sheet.  
According to the literature dedicated to the subject, the principle of immediate 
payment was advantageous to depressed Southern Europe because it was widely 
believed that expanding money supply would cut unemployment rather than lead to 
sharp price rises. According to Neal (Neal, 1979, ?. 393) the bigger the clearing 
surplus and the higher the mark rate were under the principle of immediate 
payment, the stronger the expansionary effect for Central and South European 
central banks would be. Thus Hungary, which adhered to the principle of 
                                                 
33 For more details see Lindert and Kindleberger (1983, [1982]) and Kindleberger (1988, 
[1973]). Sometimes the two methods are termed the financing and waiting principles. 22   
immediate payment, experienced economic growth and an improving balance of 
trade. Romania, in contrast, exercised the principle of delayed payment which 
impacted its economic development (Neal, 1979)
34. Bulgaria, as Hungary, applied 
the principle of immediate payment in clearing, and the effects on money supply 
expansion can be studied in the balance sheet data (table 6). The increasing value 
of Miscellaneous Foreign Currencies on the asset side of the BNB books closely 
followed receipts of non-gold bloc foreign exchange from clearing and other 
agreements (BNB, 2001). The growth of this item was much faster after 1938, 
when huge positive balances in German clearing were recorded.  
Table 6: BNB balance sheets 1928-1938 (millions of leva) 
Assets 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940
Gold and silver holdings 
1 1598 1879 1874 1900 2049 2586 2301
Receivables in gold foreign currencies 
(article 10 of BNB Law)
2736 481 92 26 0 0 4
Other foreign currencies 534 152 116 174 772 1279 2336
Domestic credit 
2 5362 4267 3913 3724 4336 4829 8021
Treasury bonds 0 0 130 310 0 0 0
Other items 
3 164 375 247 252 215 146 557
Total assets 10394 7154 6373 6386 7372 8839 13219
Capital 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Reserve funds 1149 1169 1191 1240 1241 1188 1207
Banknotes in circulation 4173 3296 2635 2449 2571 2800 6518
Deposits 
4 3862 1817 1813 1872 2382 3707 3785
Other liabilities 
5 637 287 203 277 546 443 937
Profit 71 83 32 48 133 202 272
Total liabilities 10393 7154 6373 6386 7372 8839 13219
Liabilities
 
Note: 1. Gold and silver holdings including coins. 2. Domestic credit comprises receivables from 
government, banks, commercial paper, and effects. 3. Property and other assets. 4. Demand, time and 
other deposits by government and banks. 5. Liabilities in gold and other foreign currencies.  
Source: Original balance sheet data from the BNB (1999) 120 Years Bulgarian National Bank, p. 
130. 
In late 1939 exchange control was transformed from an instrument of 
stabilisation into a lever for marshalling war resources. The military logic of 
exchange control was apparent much earlier in Germany and Italy, which in the 
late Thirties subordinated foreign trade to war needs. The final point in the 
relationships with Bulgaria for instance (and before that with Romania) was the 
1940 clearing agreement (the BNB did not participate in negotiations because of its 
                                                 
34 As mentioned above, Italy later altered the delayed payment principle to immediate 
payment.   
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specific position) which was extremely slanted in favour of Germany (the 
Reichsmark rate was unfavourable, for one thing), allowing it to transfer resources 
from Bulgaria. Since 1934 Bulgaria had scored positive clearing balances which 
were covered neither by import of machines and goods, nor by capital inflow from 
Germany. In principle Bulgaria exported agricultural products and imported 
commodities and industrial materials (table 7)
35. 
Table 7: Share of goods categories in total import (%) 
Goods categories 1921 1923 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1936
Commodities and raw materials 
(incl. fuels)
38.5 50.2 54.3 56.4 58.9 70.2 63.4 63.8
Final manufactured goods 59.6 48.1 43.3 41.1 39.2 28 34.9 34.4
Food and drinks 1.9 1.7 2.4 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 
Source: Toshev (1943, p.90). 
In Bulgaria, as elsewhere, exchange control performed another function 
alongside monetary and financial stabilisation and balance of payment 
restrictions
36. Though considered only implicitly, this function was growing in 
importance. It entailed using exchange control to stimulate or restrict sectors and 
branches of the economy; according to Paul Einzig exchange control became a 
“weapon of commercial policy” (Einzig, 1934). Moreover, the League of Nations’ 
report on exchange control noted: 
“… the control is now applied as an a ctive instrument of 
commercial policy and for the further purpose of placing a barrier 
between world and domestic prices, so that monetary and general 
economic policies could be chosen and executed without regard to 
their effects on the balance of payments” (League of Nations, 1938, p. 
22) 
Though the initial reason for this kind of industrial policy was to limit 
expensive imports (thus the BNB argued in favour of importing commodities and 
materials rather than machines because the former were cheaper; BNB, 2004, p. 
91),in time the necessity of protecting the indigenous industry and cutting 
unemployment moved to the fore
37. In other words, exchange control and foreign 
trade restrictions in general (quotas and tariffs) obtained predominantly domestic 
functions. Economists often argued that “encouraged industry” ( nasarchena 
                                                 
35 Some economists criticise increased dependence on imported materials. 
36 Ellis (1947) describes the purposes (domestic and external) and instruments of exchange 
control in detail. 
37 The 1928 National Industrial Promotion Act provided various encouragements and duty 
waivers before losing effect partly due to exchange control in 1931. A new 1936 Act made 
customs regulations particularly important for protecting industry (for details see Toshev, 
1943). 24   
industria) and overprotection hit consumers and general entrepreneurship since 
protecting domestic production hampered competition and led to the rise of 
monopolistic domestic industries
38. In  Toshev’s opinion “the importance of 
international trade agreements was diminishing after 1932 with respect to domestic 
industry since another very effective instrument compensated for trade 
concessions, and namely the BNB exchange rate policy” (Toshev, 1943, p.85). 
As a result of exchange control maintained throughout the Thirties, and of 
intensified trade with Germany, the lev rate  appreciated gradually during the 
thirties reaching 18.5% in 1937 in nominal effective terms compared to the base 
year 1929 (Ivanov et al., 2007) (figure 2)
39. The nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) calculated with exchange rate premia illustrates the path of an alternative 
devaluation or the market determined path of exchange rate development. 
Bulgarian exporters however, faced stimulating development of the real effective 
exchange rate which had started to devalue since 1930 due to the diverging 
inflation differential of the lower price level in Bulgaria compared to the weighted 
price level of its main trading partners. Nevertheless,  Bulgaria was unable to 
benefit from this competitive position due to universal foreign trade restrictions. 
Moreover, the agricultural price drop was so sharp and sudden that the increasing 
volume of export did not result in an increase of the value of total export. 
Therefore, the exchange rate premia applied to a limited number of private deals 
and, estimated at a quarter depreciation of the officially maintained nominal 
exchange rate on average between 1935 and 1939
40, had a smaller real effect (5.7 
per cent) and a very marginal effect if any on total exports
41 development.  
 
                                                 
38 It is often said that increasing discrepancy between industrial and agricultural 
development translates into price scissors, different income levels, and hence wealth 
redistribution.  
39 Interestingly, arbitration calculations (across the Romanian leu) of Christophoroff 
generated some 20 per cent appreciation of the Reichsmark against the Bulgarian lev after 
1934,  i. e. a mark was worth 25 leva while the official exchange rate was 33 leva 
(Christophoroff, 1939, p. 20). 
40 Data available in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Bulgaria. 
41 As a result general and particular exchange restrictions became a focus of conflict 
between interest groups (industrialists, merchants, farmers). The course of the debate shows 
that little attention was paid to consumers. Simple evidence of this is the lists of goods 
subject to import restrictions, among which cobbling leather, sugar, cotton, wool, and 
others of definite interest to consumers. Charles Kindelberger (see textbook by Lindert and 
Kindleberger, 1983 [1982]) develops the idea of the redistributing effect of trade and 
exchange restrictions in detail.   
  25 











1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
NEER REER NEER plus exchange rate premiums REER plus exchange rate premiums  
Source: own estimates. For more details see Ivanov et al., 2007. 
4.  Theoretical Reflections and Discussion: the Macroeconomics of 
Exchange Control 
Before proceeding with our analysis, it is important to point out that the 
theoretically postulated relationships we are studying are questionable in 
themselves due to the complexity of exchange controls. Moreover, empirical 
estimates are often far from conclusive, not only because of the lack of consistent 
disaggregated data, but also due to government interference at the micro level 
(estimates of centrally planned economies are similarly inconclusive). The 
complexity of exchange controls requires simplification; therefore the reasoning 
below addresses an ‘idealised’ exchange control model. 
The studies of how exchange control was introduced and practiced in Italy and 
Bulgaria are eloquent examples of how serious t he  balance of payments 
constraint was at the time and how difficult it was to circumvent it.  
Before the First World War, the balance of payments constraint was overcome 
by the relatively automatic mechanism of the gold standard and the so-called ‘rules 
of the game.’ Even when these rules were violated, the London financial centre and 
the Bank of England with other major central banks, allowed for the functioning of 
the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) on an international scale. The war, however, 
destroyed this institutional framework and led to the formation of different political 26   
and economic blocs and the spread of political and economic nationalism. As 
pointed out, despite attempts to restore the pre-war situation, during the Twenties 
many European countries  had severe current account and budget deficits and 
followed diverging political and economic objectives, independently or within a 
bloc. Under these new circumstances, exchange control can be interpreted as an 
example of the new economic paradigm which attributed an active role to the 
government in the economy. We should remind the reader that before the war, 
governments’ and central banks’ discretionary powers in relation to the exchange 
rate were rather limited and used only under set extreme conditions, such as wars.  
Exchange control in Bulgaria and Italy, as well as in countries like Germany, 
Austria, and Hungary, was a specific alternative both to devaluation and to 
deflation, which for various reasons were much more economically and politically 
costly. In this context exchange control was a form of isolationism which protected 
domestic capital markets from international capital flows. Devaluation was 
unacceptable to countries which had experienced inflation and financial crisis, and 
which had just stabilised their currencies. What is more, most countries with 
exchange control (except Italy) had been defeated in the War and had considerable 
external liabilities. They were debtors who not only wanted to preserve their 
reputation as good payers but most probably also tried to extract maximum profit 
from their appreciated currencies. As currencies in which foreign liabilities were 
denominated (the pound Sterling, dollar, and French or Swiss franc) devalued, they 
decreased debt burden directly by automatic recalculation of foreign liabilities
42. 
Debtor nations wanted to preserve their reputation as good payers (Bulgaria) or 
among the electorate (Italy).  
The balance of payments constraint was of course more binding in Bulgaria 
than in Italy. In Bulgaria the burden of foreign debt and the constraint of weak 
foreign reserves
43 were more intense
44. Its government, therefore, had to introduce 
foreign exchange restrictions considerably earlier
45 and stabilize the lev 
administratively: an early form of exchange control. 
                                                 
42 In Heuser (1939, ?. 26-27) “Although in general import restrictions are determined by 
necessity to defend the stabilized national currencies, the reasons slightly differ between 
debtor and creditor countries. For instance for debtor countries like Bulgaria, Greece, 
Romania and Estonia the constraint on the balance of payment is dominating, while there 
are also other reasons as important as the deterioration of the foreign trade balance in 
creditor countries”. 
43 According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Bulgaria was the country with 
the greatest lack of capital and investment in Europe (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1936, p. 120).  
44 The choice of exchange control methods depended on other factors such as contracts or 
political and purely ideological reasons (Heuser, 1939, ?. 48).  
45 As pointed out in Heuser (1939, ?. 41) “… in the case of Bulgaria the chief control of 
imports has from the beginning been part of the general system of exchange control.”  
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There is no doubt that the basic question is, to what extent exchange control as a 
form of government interference helps or harms macroeconomic stability and 
economic growth
46. Before answering it, however, let us first address some 
technical details of the exchange control mechanism which could help us explain 
the main macroeconomic interrelations, and particularly the forms of control over 
the balance of payments and different types of clearing. 
The methods of foreign reserve accumulation and exchange rate pegging could 
be classified into two types of balance of payments control. The first, trade control, 
involves indirect influence on the forex market through the basic markets 
determining foreign currency supply and demand, i. e. import and export markets 
for goods, services, and capital. The second, exchange control, involves direct 
control of the foreign exchange market by determining the volume of traded 
foreign currencies
47. In the first type, the volume of foreign currencies depends on 
import and export flows which are limited or enforced. In the second type we have 
the opposite: there is an a priori determined amount of foreign currency, once what 
is necessary for debt servicing has been earmarked, and imports are constrained by 
this amount. The government further interferes directly on import and export 
markets to accomplish its goal of foreign reserve accumulation. Despite the fact 
that both mechanisms give similar long term results (both interfere with the 
efficient allocation of resources), we have to consider that direct control of the 
foreign exchange market is considerably more complex to enforce and has 
remarkably adverse overall effects
48. 
Under trade control, de facto import control, two types of restrictions can be 
identified: price discrimination (tariffs and customs duties) and volume 
discrimination (quotas and barter). The former type fixes import prices above their 
equilibrium level by adding customs duties and tariffs and the volume becomes a 
function of this fixed price level. The latter fixes the volume (usually at a level 
lower than equilibrium) and the price follows accordingly. The historical record 
proves that exchange control of the first type has not always accomplished its 
foreign exchange market aims because of the decentralized behaviour of importers 
and exporters.  
                                                 
46 Ellis (1940) provides an interesting exposition of the exchange control theory and its 
macroeconomic consequences. 
47 Technically, exchange control is a logical continuation of import tariffs and quotas which 
have failed to fulfil their purpose of improving the balance of trade (Kulicher, 2002, [1929] 
and Kindleberger, 1988, [1973]). Diminishing foreign reserves threaten stabilised national 
currencies and regular foreign debt service. Consequently, trade difficulties lead to the 
evolution of exchange controls from unilateral to bilateral clearing and on to private 
exchange barter and exchange premium (in the case of Bulgaria in 1935) in order to direct 
trade towards free currency countries.  
48 See international trade textbooks (for example Vanek, 1962; Lindert and Kindleberger, 
1983, [1982] ).  28   
Under exchange control the central bank can fix the supply of foreign currency 
directly. Thereafter, if the goal is to boost the foreign exchange supply, exchange 
premiums are an appropriate instrument. A violation of the static foreign exchange 
monopoly, they allow for some very limited flexibility of the legally fixed 
exchange rate with the sole purpose of stimulating export. In principle, once the 
volume of foreign exchange and the exchange rate are given, the next logical step 
is to control imports and exports totally through leaves and licenses; hence goods 
markets become a function of a predetermined foreign exchange market 
equilibrium. There is little doubt that this form of exchange control is considerably 
stronger and entails a more substantial violation of the market mechanisms for the 
efficient distribution of scarce resources. It is also more difficult to maintain, as 
evidenced by the black market in currency, smuggling, corruption, and other forms 
of lawbreaking exemplified by the case of the two Italians in Bulgaria.  
The other technical detail concerns clearing. We shall take the example of 
interwar Bulgaria and try to narrow things down to the role of clearing with 
Germany in the development of the Bulgarian  economy after 1932
49. There are 
different opinions about the German impact on Southern Europe, from unqualified 
support of clearing to the opposite extreme of its total denigration alongside 
accusations of German exploitation. 
Here we would like to remind the reader about the scheme of clearing (chart 2) 
which we discussed in section 2 (the immediate payment or financing principle, 
and the delayed payment principle). G stands for the German central bank, B  is the 
BNB,  XB is Bulgarian export to Germany,  XG i s German export to Bulgaria or 
Bulgarian import from Germany, and M is the additional monetary flow created by 
the Bulgarian central bank due to the clearing surplus (in our case 90). In the case 
of immediate payment (the financing principle) applied in Bulgaria (the same as in 
Hungary and later in Italy) as a result of the positive clearing surplus [XB (100) > 
XG (10)], domestic money supply automatically expands (the clearing surplus is 
multiplied by the clearing exchange rate (assumed at unity
50).  
Under this financing principle the central bank bought the receivables from its 
exporters at the fixed clearing exchange rate. Under the other postponed payments 
principle (as employed in Romania)
51 the central bank waited for the counterparty 
to settle the clearing balance, hence the positive surplus was not monetised 
immediately and there was no monetary expansion at home. In the first case the 
positive surplus appeared as debt/credit respectively on the books of the German 
central bank and the BNB. In the second case there was no additional monetary 
creation and the clearing debt/credit position was not on the books but below the 
                                                 
49 For details about the interrelations between the dynamics of the Bulgarian and German 
economies see Christophoroff (1939) and also Fisher (1939, p. 154) 
50 In the real Bulgarian case the rate was 1RM = 33 leva. 
51 See for instance Neal (1979).   
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line (off-balance sheet). In this waiting principle the clearing surplus (90) had a 
depreciating effect on the mark (as mentioned by Larry Neal)
52.  
Chart 1: Two methods of clearing 
 
First, we note that clearing substantially impacted money supply and price 
levels. As noted above, due to the specific method of clearing with Germany (in 
contrast with, say, Romania)
53, Bulgaria maintained a flat clearing rate of 33 leva 
to the mark. The positive clearing balance Bulgaria accumulated led to the 
expansion of money supply and inevitably to price and income increases, and 
consequently to economic expansion. This scenario has positive features given the 
fact that deflation in the Thirties had severely damaged agriculture
54. This 
expansion through the immediate payment method can be accommodated within 
the overall German ‘contagion’ of the Bulgarian economic cycle as described by 
Christophoroff (1939).  
As the National Socialists came to power in Germany in 1933, the economy 
was experiencing credit growth and expansion of government spending. This 
logically followed the 1932 clearing agreement between Bulgaria and Germany 
and the consequent BNB departure from a strict deflationary policy and the 
                                                 
52 In this case we could assume the clearing rate to move from 1 to around 0.1, ceteris 
paribus.  
53 Romania tried several times to renegotiate its clearing rate with Germany. 
54 Interestingly, in the financing principle adjustments are realised by price levels, whereas 
in the delay principle by the fluctuating sperrmark rate. Thus in Bulgaria domestic price 
rises, due to monetary expansion, cut Bulgarian competitiveness in Germany,  i. e. they 
reduced mark appreciation. In Romania there were no price rises but the sperrmark 
depreciated on the Romanian market. When the waiting period ended the sperrmark rose 
approaching its previous level. We could also assume that the financing principle affected 
Bulgarian competitiveness not only in Germany but also elsewhere, prompting exchange 
premia to stimulate trade with free currency countries. Neal (1979, p. 400) saw financing 
principle countries as being politically closer to Germany.  30   
introduction of exchange premia in mid-1933.  
The actual development of the Bulgarian cycle (see Christophoroff, 1939) 
confirms the above logic of exchange control development. In a comparative 
perspective, Larry Neal (1979)
55 argues that the different methods of payment 
explain higher Hungarian growth in contrast with the difficulties faced by 
Romania. Paul Einzig (1955) describes the different mechanisms by which 
Germany first exported inflation to South-Eastern Europe and then pursued 
deflation at home. Germany accumulated positive clearing balances and used the 
financing principle nations (Bulgaria and Hungary) to finance German economy by 
inflation or devaluation. Therefore it was against the German interest to introduce 
the mark into South-Eastern Europe as this would deny it the inflation/devaluation 
levers. (Interesting parallels could be drawn with the present refusal of older 
eurozone countries to put the euro into circulation in new accession states.) 
Second, we note that exchange control in clearing influenced the real exchange 
rate and overall national terms of trade. Despite the many difficulties in calculating 
terms of trade in the framework of clearing and exchange control (see Neal, 1979, 
Friedman, 1976, and Tattara, 1991), there is consensus among researchers that 
German terms of trade developed unfavourably for Southern Europe (i. e., the ratio 
of export prices to import prices fell). This is supported by the overvaluation of the 
Reichsmark in clearing exchange rates
56. Under these circumstances immediate 
payment and hence money expansion in clearing creditor countries (e. g. Bulgaria) 
postponed real Reichsmark appreciation against the lev and boosted lev 
appreciation against the Reichsmark. In a sense, this was a compensating 
mechanism in the context of trade flows between Bulgaria and Germany given the 
fact that both sides opposed devaluation
57.  
As a whole we dare argue that exchange control and clearing in particular 
                                                 
55 Friedman (1976) tries to measure the welfare benefits and the losses for Hungary clearing 
with Germany, comparing the term of trade in the clearing area and outside the clearing 
area and comparing the deferent export elasticity for the two areas.  
56 The problem of the overvalued Reichsmark was solved by private clearing agreements 
within Germany through the flexible exchange rate of the ?SKI marks and through the 
mechanism of sperrmarks (see Neal, 1979). 
57 It is interesting to note that the main principles of proposed clearing system as a general 
form of building the international financial relations is later on again put forward by 
Keynes (even if not explicitly stressed by him) as a part of his plan for reforming the 
international financial system after WWII (Dam, 1982, Triffin, 1969, [1968]). In his plan 
Keynes explicitly shares his conviction that a balancing mechanism is feasible in the 
frameworks of a global clearing, and his wish for this mechanism to be relatively 
symmetric (in contrast to the Gold standard). This means part of the burden is spread 
among the creditors. In a sense, Keynes’s proposal confirms that the exchange control is a 
weapon used by debtors, regardless of whether they are producers, consumers or entire 
countries.  
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stimulated the Bulgarian economy under the circumstances of global deflation and 
international trade restrictions. Importantly, exchange control was also significant 
for national industrial development which falls outside the scope of the present 
paper.  
Third, we note that the Italian and Bulgarian balance of payments restrictions 
could be interpreted in the light of the well known saving/investment equilibrium 
in an open economy. If we assume that private saving is constant, an increase in the 
budget deficit and/or private investment  has to worsen the balance of trade. 
Naturally, the aggregate approach presents some methodological and analytical  
problems. However, it is correct to point out that both countries’ trade deficits were 
caused not only by the price drop of agricultural products in the early Thirties 
(more for Bulgaria than Italy) but also by the considerable increase of public 
expenditures later in the decade in preparation for war (more for Italy than for 
Bulgaria). Mussolini’s ambitious imperialism has been studied at length (cf. among 
others De Felice, 1981; Miller and Kagan, 1997); Bulgaria also had its Balkan 
ambitions as a prospective German ally. Increasing public expenditures since 1934, 
however, were counterbalanced by great efforts to attain surpluses from 1936 
(Christophoroff, 1939, pp. 100-105). This line of reasoning shows Italian and 
Bulgarian exchange control as an instrument of government interference, 
nationalisation, militarisation, and economic isolation.  
Fourth, we note interesting parallels between the Thirties and today’s Italian 
and Bulgarian economies and that of the European Union.  
The First World War caused a sudden collapse of the world economy. Money 
supply, relative prices, and the structure of the balance of payments irreversibly 
changed. New social and political subjects appeared whose interests were related to 
those of the debtors and those who opposed deflation. Money became fiduciary, 
while capital movements dominated the balance of payments. Failure to revive the 
pre-war situation and the Great Depression accelerated national isolation and war 
preparations. This line of reasoning shows exchange control as an organic element 
of the closed economy. At the beginning it was viewed as an alternative to 
devaluation and deflation and a way of overcoming the balance of payments 
constraint; in time it became an instrument for mobilising war resources. In this 
aspect Italy and Bulgaria followed similar trajectories: both were forced to opt for 
isolation and exchange control as an alternative to devaluation and deflation. 
Today Italy and Bulgaria are members of the EU which, at least in principle, is 
a framework for avoiding economic isolation and war in Europe. In a sense, the 
balance of payments constraint, which was felt at the national level, is now partly 
transferred to the European scale. By adopting the common currency Italy can no 
longer improve its competitiveness through devaluation, while the currency board 
in Bulgaria (which is not a eurozone member yet) commits it to low inflation and a 
restrictive fiscal policy. Today as in the interwar period, European economies can 
prosper in the long run only by adopting healthy fiscal and monetary policies and 32   
increasing productivity. Yet, unlikely as economic isolation and autarchy may 
appear, we should remember that these pathologies were  unlikely at the beginning 
of the Twentieth Century too.
58 
 
5.  Conclusions 
We can thus summarise the main results of our study: first, interwar exchange 
control resulted from balance of payments constraints which were particularly 
severe for peripheral and semi-peripheral countries given the collapse of the world 
economic and monetary equilibrium. During the Thirties the relatively automatic 
mechanism of the gold standard and the LLR functions performed by the Bank of 
England and central banks in the financial core no longer existed, while ideas of a 
global LLR like today’s IMF were nascent. The League of Nations lacked the 
authority to restore pre-war financial relations and implement a new system. 
Second, peripheral and semi peripheral countries like Bulgaria and Italy, which 
had a long record of poor discipline and lacked good monetary management 
traditions, preferred fixed exchange rates which symbolized monetary stability and 
enhanced credibility. For this they needed foreign reserves which, however, rapidly 
decreased through balance of payments deficits. The latter were caused mainly by 
dramatic drops in farming prices, capital outflows, and later by costly rearmament 
(in particular in Italy). Moreover, most countries opting for exchange control (Italy 
was an exception) had been defeated in the war and laboured under a heavy debt 
burden.  
Third, the exchange control bloc included countries with similar problems, 
similar preferences and characteristics. Together with the S terling bloc (which 
included Great Britain and its colonial system) and the Gold bloc (with France in 
the lead), the exchange control bloc, with Germany at the  centre, had its own basic 
equalizing mechanism. From a technical point of view the exchange control can be 
seen as an alternative strategy to devaluation (pursued by the Sterling bloc) and to 
deflation and wage decreases (pursued by the Gold bloc). At a more disaggregate 
level, when we study the techniques of the exchange control, we find several 
details (like exchange premiums for example) which are de facto in conflict with 
the fixed exchange rate principles.  
Fourth, our study of exchange control reveals interesting macro interrelations. 
While there is some obvious macroeconomic asymmetry within exchange control 
countries (in fact there was a similar asymmetry during the pre-war classical gold 
standard), we observe certain equilibrating processes in relation to the main 
macroeconomic parameters and in foreign trade. Of course, such processes could 
only be regarded as secondary. There is no doubt that exchange control was a 
                                                 
58 See Fromkin (2004), Frieden (2006)  
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serious interference in market mechanisms. Furthermore, history shows that 
exchange control was characterized by corruption and political favouritism and had 
strong distorting redistribution effects: it tended to favour certain groups which 
were connected to the authorities in one way or another. These microeconomics 
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